Abstract. Predicate encryption is a new paradigm for public-key encryption that generalizes identity-based encryption and more. In predicate encryption, secret keys correspond to predicates and ciphertexts are associated with attributes; the secret key SK f corresponding to a predicate f can be used to decrypt a ciphertext associated with attribute I if and only if f (I) = 1. Constructions of such schemes are currently known only for certain classes of predicates.
Introduction
Traditional public-key encryption is coarse grained: a sender encrypts a message M with respect to a public key PK, and only the owner of the (unique) secret key associated with PK can decrypt the resulting ciphertext and recover the message. These straightforward semantics suffice for point-to-point communication, where encrypted data is intended for one particular recipient who is known in advance to the sender. In other settings, however, the sender may instead want to define a policy determining who is allowed to recover the encrypted data. For example, classified data might be associated with certain keywords; this data should be accessible both to users who are allowed to read all classified information, as well as to users allowed to read information associated with the particular keywords in question. Or, perhaps a patient's records should be accessible only to physicians who have treated that patient in the past. In other applications, it may be sufficient to detect only whether a certain predicate is satisfied; for example, an email firewall should potentially be able to evaluate whether an encrypted email satisfies certain attributes (so that it can be forwarded appropriately), without learning anything else about the encrypted message.
Applications such as those sketched above require new cryptographic mechanisms that provide more fine-grained control over access to encrypted data. Predicate encryption offers one such tool. At a high level (formal definitions are given in Sect. 2), secret keys in a predicate encryption scheme correspond to predicates (i.e., boolean functions) in some class F , and a sender associates a ciphertext with an attribute from a set Σ ; a ciphertext associated with the attribute I ∈ Σ can be decrypted by a secret key SK f corresponding to the predicate f ∈ F if and only if f (I ) = 1.
The "basic" level of security achieved by such schemes guarantees, informally, that a ciphertext associated with attribute I hides all information about the underlying message unless one is in possession of a secret key giving the explicit ability to decrypt. That is, if an adversary A holds keys SK f 1 , . . . , SK f , then A learns nothing about the message if f 1 (I ) = · · · = f (I ) = 0. We refer to this security notion as payload hiding. A stronger notion of security that we call attribute hiding requires that the ciphertext hides the message as above, and additionally requires that the ciphertext hides all information about the associated attribute I except that which is explicitly leaked by the keys in one's possession. That is, an adversary holding secret keys as above learns only f 1 (I ), . . . , f (I ) (and the message, in case one of these evaluates to 1), but learns nothing else about I . See Sect. 2 for formal definitions.
Much prior work can be cast in the framework of predicate encryption. Identitybased encryption (IBE) [5, 6, 8, 18, 19, 33, 37] can be viewed as predicate encryption for the class of equality tests; the standard notion of security for IBE [8, 18] corresponds to payload hiding, while anonymous IBE [1, 11, 16, 22] corresponds to the stronger notion of attribute hiding. Forward-secure public-key encryption [18] can be viewed as predicate encryption for the class of greater-than predicates. Attribute-based encryption schemes [4, 23, 30, 32] and schemes supporting range queries [35] can also be cast in the framework of predicate encryption. (In this case all the listed constructions achieve payload hiding only.) Boneh and Waters [9] construct a predicate encryption scheme that handles range queries as well as conjunctions of, e.g., equality tests; their scheme satisfies the stronger notion of attribute hiding.
Other work introducing concepts related to the idea of predicate encryption includes [2, 3] . In contrast to the present work, however, the threat model in those works does not consider collusion among users holding different secret keys.
Our Results
An important research direction is to construct predicate encryption schemes for predicate classes F that are as expressive as possible, with the ultimate goal being to handle all polynomial-time predicates. In addition, it is of independent interest to explore constructions of attribute-hiding (in contrast to payload-hiding) schemes. In this work, we make progress in both these directions.
The aim of our work is to construct attribute-hiding schemes handling disjunctions. Most prior work (as surveyed above) yields only payload-hiding schemes, and existing techniques for obtaining attribute hiding are limited to handling conjunctions. (Indeed, handling disjunctions was left as an open question in [9] .) On a technical level, this is because the underlying cryptographic mechanism used in the schemes handling conjunctions is to pair components of the secret key with corresponding components of the ciphertext and then multiply the intermediate results together; a "cancelation" in the exponent occurs if everything "matches," but a random group element results if there is any "mismatch." Thus, the holder of a non-matching secret key learns only that there was a mismatch in at least one position, but does not learn the number of mismatches or their locations (as required for attribute hiding). On the other hand, very different techniques seem needed to support disjunctions since now a mismatch in a single position should not give a random group element but must instead somehow result in a "cancelation" if there is a match in any other position. ( We stress that what makes this difficult when attribute hiding is desired is that we must hide the position of a match, and only reveal the existence of a match in at least one position.)
As a stepping stone toward an attribute-hiding scheme handling disjunctions, we first focus on predicates corresponding to the computation of inner products over Z N (for some large integer N ). Formally, we take Σ = Z N as our set of attributes, and take our class of predicates to be F = {f x | x ∈ Z N } where f x ( y) = 1 iff x, y = 0. (Here, x, y denotes the standard inner product i=1 x i · y i mod N of two vectors x and y.) We construct a predicate encryption scheme for this F without random oracles, based on two new assumptions in composite-order groups equipped with a bilinear map. Our assumptions are non-interactive and of constant size, and can be shown to hold in an extension of the generic-group model where a bilinear map is provided and compositeorder groups are allowed. A pessimistic interpretation of our results would be that we prove security in the generic-group model, but we believe it is notable that we are able to distill our necessary assumptions to ones that are compact and falsifiable.
Our construction uses new techniques, most prominently the fact that we work in a bilinear group whose order is a product of three primes. (In follow-up work, Freeman [20] shows how to modify our construction so that it works using groups of prime order. Okamoto and Takashima [29] show a different construction that only achieves payload hiding.)
We view our main construction as a significant step toward increasing the expressiveness of predicate encryption. Moreover, we show that any predicate encryption scheme supporting "inner-product" predicates as described above can be used as a building block to construct predicates of more general types:
• As an easy warm-up, we show that it implies (anonymous) identity-based encryption as well as hidden-vector encryption [9] . As a consequence, our work implies all the results of [9] .
• We can also construct predicate encryption schemes supporting polynomial evaluation. Here, we take Z N as our set of attributes, and predicates correspond to polynomials over Z N of some bounded degree; a predicate evaluates to 1 iff the corresponding polynomial evaluates to 0 on the attribute in question. We can also extend this to include multi-variate polynomials (in a bounded number of variables). A "dual" of this construction allows the attributes to be polynomials, and the predicates to correspond to evaluation at a fixed point.
• Given the above, we can fairly easily support predicates that are disjunctions of other predicates (e.g., equality), thus achieving our main goal. In the context of identity-based encryption, this gives the ability to issue a secret key corresponding to a set S of identities that enables decryption whenever a ciphertext is encrypted to any one of the identities in S (without leaking which identity was actually used when encrypting).
• We show how to handle predicates corresponding to bounded-size DNF and CNF formulas.
• Working directly with our "inner-product" construction, we can derive a scheme supporting threshold queries of the following form: Attributes are subsets of A = {1, . . . , }, and predicates take the form {f S,t | S ⊆ A} where f S,t (S ) = 1 iff |S ∩ S | = t. This is useful in the "fuzzy IBE" setting of Sahai and Waters [32] , and improves on their work in that we achieve attribute hiding (rather than only payload hiding) and handle exact thresholds.
We defer further discussion regarding the above to Sect. 5.
Subsequent Work
Our inner-product scheme is proven secure in the "selective" security model [18] where the adversary is required to output the "challenge attributes" in advance, before the public key is generated. An important question left open by our work is to construct an inner-product scheme secure under an "adaptive" definition where the adversary may decide on the challenge attributes after observing the public key and obtaining some set of secret keys. Recent work of Lewko et al. [26] makes partial progress on this question by giving a construction that is secure given an additional restriction on the keys the adversary is allowed to obtain: specifically, the adversary is only allowed to obtain keys whose inner product is non-zero with respect to both challenge attributes. Unfortunately, this restriction precludes our main motivating application of handling disjunctions. Since our work, Okamoto and Takashima have investigated hierarchical innerproduct encryption [28] as well as a combination of inner-product encryption and attribute-based encryption [29] .
Various extensions and generalizations of predicate encryption have been considered. Shi, Shen, and Waters [34] explored a secret-parameters variant of predicate encryption in relation to a new definition of security (which cannot be achieved in the publicparameters setting) where secret keys should not leak information about the predicates to which they correspond. Sahai and Seyalioglu [31] consider a definition in a setting with a public-key infrastructure where the central authority cannot decrypt honestly generated ciphertexts. Boneh, Sahai, and Waters proposed a generalization of predicate encryption called functional encryption [14] .
Definitions
We provide formal definitions, following [9] , for the syntax of predicate encryption and the security properties discussed informally in the introduction. Throughout this section, we consider the general case where Σ denotes an arbitrary set of attributes and F denotes an arbitrary set of predicates over Σ . Formally, both Σ and F may depend on the security parameter and/or the master public parameters (and, indeed, this will be the case in our main constructions); for simplicity, we leave this dependence implicit. We let PPT stand for "probabilistic polynomial time." Definition 2.1. A predicate encryption scheme for the class of predicates F over the set of attributes Σ consists of four (randomized) PPT algorithms Setup, Enc, GenKey, Dec such that:
• Setup takes as input the security parameter 1 n and outputs a (master) public key PK and a (master) secret key SK.
• Enc takes as input the public key PK, an attribute I ∈ Σ , and a message M in some associated message space. It returns a ciphertext C. We write this as C ← Enc PK (I, M).
• GenKey takes as input the master secret key SK and a (description of a) predicate f ∈ F . It outputs a key SK f .
• Dec takes as input a secret key SK f and a ciphertext C. It outputs either a message M or the distinguished symbol ⊥.
For correctness, we require that for all n, all (PK, SK) generated by Setup(1 n ), all f ∈ F , any key SK f ← GenKey SK (f ), and all I ∈ Σ :
=⊥ with all but negligible probability.
A useful variant of the above is a predicate-only scheme. Here, Enc takes only an attribute I (and no message), and the correctness requirement is that Dec SK f (Enc PK (I )) = f (I ) except possibly with negligible probability. One can further relax the correctness requirement (in either case) so that correctness is required to hold only in a computational sense; namely, that it is hard to find f and I for which Dec SK f (Enc PK (I )) = f (I ). Our schemes satisfy this notion of correctness.
Our definition of attribute-hiding security corresponds to the notion described informally earlier. An adversary may request keys corresponding to the predicates f 1 , . . . , f , and is given either Enc
The goal of the adversary is to determine which attribute/message pair was encrypted, and the stated conditions ensure that this is not trivial. We use the "selective" notion of security introduced in [18] , where I 0 , I 1 must be chosen by the adversary in advance. (Observe that when specialized to the case when F consists of equality tests on strings, the definition corresponds to anonymous IBE with selective-ID security.) Our definition corresponds to security against chosen-plaintext attacks, and we do not consider chosen-ciphertext attacks in this work.
Definition 2.2.
A predicate encryption scheme with respect to F and Σ is attribute hiding if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the following experiment is negligible in the security parameter n: The advantage of A is the absolute value of the difference between its success probability and 1/2.
For predicate-only encryption schemes, attribute hiding is defined by simply omitting the messages in the above experiment. Payload hiding, a strictly weaker notion of security, is defined by forcing I 0 = I 1 = I in the above experiment (in which case A has advantage 0 if f i (I ) = 1 for any i).
Background on Pairings and Complexity Assumptions
We assume some familiarity with bilinear maps as used, e.g., in [8, 24, 25] , though our treatment will be self-contained. We focus specifically on bilinear groups of composite order, first used in cryptographic applications by [12] . In contrast to all prior work using composite-order bilinear groups, however, we use groups whose order N is a product of three (distinct) primes.
All groups are written multiplicatively with identity element 1. Let G be an algorithm that takes as input a security parameter 1 n and outputs a tuple (p, q, r, G, G T ,ê) where p, q, r are distinct primes, G and G T are two cyclic groups of order N = pqr, andê : G × G → G T is a non-degenerate bilinear map: i.e., for all u, v ∈ G and all a, b ∈ Z we haveê(u a , v b ) =ê(u, v) ab , and if g generates G thenê(g, g) generates G T . We assume multiplication in G and G T , as well as the bilinear mapê, are all computable in time polynomial in n. Furthermore, we assume that the descriptions of G and G T include generators of G and G T , respectively. An algorithm G with the required properties can be based on supersingular elliptic curves with the modified Weil or Tate pairing used forê; we refer to [8, 12, 21] for details.
We use the notation G p , G q , G r to denote the subgroups of G having order p, q, and r, respectively. In addition, let G pq denote the subgroup of order pq, let G pr denote the subgroup of order pr, and let G qr denote the subgroup of order qr. Note also that if g is a generator of G then the element g pq is a generator of G r , the element g pr is a generator of G q , and the element g qr is a generator of
where α 1 = log g qr h p and α 2 = log g pr h q . A similar rule holds wheneverê is applied to elements in any two subgroups whose only intersection is the identity element.
Cryptographic Assumptions
We now state the assumptions we use to prove security of our construction. These assumptions are new, but we prove in Appendix A that they hold in the generic-group model as long as finding a non-trivial factor of N (the group order) is hard. We state our assumptions explicitly and highlight that they are non-interactive (in contrast to, e.g., the LRSW assumption [17] ) and of fixed size (in contrast to, e.g., the q-SDH assumption [7] ). Only Assumption 3.1 is needed for our main (predicate-only) construction; Assumption 3.2 (in addition to Assumption 3.1) is used to construct a scheme with better efficiency.
Assumption 3.1. Let G be as above. We say that G satisfies Assumption 3.1 if the advantage of any PPT algorithm A in the following experiment is negligible in the security parameter n:
Set N = pqr, and let g p , g q , g r be generators of G p , G q , and G r , respectively. 
A outputs a bit c , and succeeds if c = c.
The advantage of A is the absolute value of the difference between its success probability and 1/2. Assumption 3.2. Let G be as above. We say that G satisfies Assumption 3.2 if the advantage of any PPT algorithm A in the following experiment is negligible in the security parameter n: The advantage of A is the absolute value of the difference between its success probability and 1/2. Assumption 3.1 can be viewed as variant of a subgroup-decision assumption (cf. [12] ), insofar as T is either an element of G pr (with random G r component) or an element of G (with random G q and G r components) and we require that it be hard to distinguish between the two possibilities. Assumption 3.2 is similar in spirit to the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (decisional-BDH) assumption [8] Both the above assumptions imply the hardness of finding any non-trivial factor of N . For Assumption 3.2 this is immediate:ê(g p , h) γ s has order p, whereas a random element of G T has order N with all but negligible probability. For Assumption 3.1,
has order pq (with all but negligible probability); thus, knowledge of p or q (and hence pr) immediately gives a distinguisher. A similar argument applied toê(
A Predicate-Only Encryption Scheme
Our main construction is a predicate encryption scheme where the set of attributes is Σ = Z N , and the class of predicates is
Here, we present a predicate-only version of the scheme based on Assumption 3.1. Note that any attribute-hiding, predicate-only scheme can be used to encrypt arbitrary length messages in a bit-by-bit fashion: To encrypt a message M using attribute x, first choose another vector x uniformly at random. Then, for i = 1, . . . , |M|, if M i = 1 encrypt using attribute x, and if M i = 0 encrypt using attribute x . Since v, x has only a negligible probability of being zero for any v, this will achieve the desired functionality and security. (Note that here we rely on attribute hiding, so that the adversary does not learn x upon seeing the ciphertext.) We show in Appendix B how the scheme below can be generalized to give a more efficient predicate encryption scheme that "natively" handles long messages, using both Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2.
Intuition for the Construction
In our construction, each ciphertext has associated with it a (secret) vector x, and each secret key corresponds to a vector v. The decryption procedure must check whether x · v = 0 mod N , and reveal nothing about x but whether this is true. To do this, we will make use of a bilinear group G whose order N is the product of three primes p, q, and r. Let G p , G q , and G r denote the subgroups of G having order p, q, and r, respectively. We will (informally) assume, as in [12] , that a random element in any of these subgroups is indistinguishable from a random element of G. 1 Thus, we can use random elements from one subgroup to "mask" elements from another subgroup.
At a high level, we will use these subgroups as follows: G q will be used to encode the vectors x and v in the ciphertext and secret keys, respectively. (This will be done, e.g., in the case of ciphertexts by putting each element of the vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) in the exponent of its own component of the ciphertext.) Computation of the inner product v, x will be done in G q , in the exponent, using the bilinear map. The subgroup G p will be used to encode an equation (again in the exponent) that evaluates to zero when decryption is done properly. This subgroup is used to prevent an adversary from improperly "manipulating" the computation (by, e.g., changing the order of components of the ciphertext or secret key, raising these components to some power, etc.). On an intuitive level, if the adversary tries to manipulate the computation in any way, then the computation occurring in the G p subgroup will no longer yield the identity (i.e., will no longer yield 0 in the exponent), but will instead have the effect of "masking" the correct answer with a random element of G p (which will invalidate the entire computation). Elements in G r are used for "general masking" of terms in other subgroups; i.e., random elements of G r are multiplied with various components of the ciphertext (and secret key) in order to "hide" information that might be present in the G p or G q subgroups.
A Predicate-Only Encryption Scheme
We now describe our scheme in detail. Below, we assume the length of vectors is fixed for simplicity, but it could also be taken as any polynomial function of the security parameter n.
it computes g p , g q , and g r as generators of G p , G q , and G r , respectively. It then chooses R 1,i , R 2,i ∈ G r and h 1,i , h 2,i ∈ G p uniformly at random for i = 1 to , and R 0 ∈ G r uniformly at random. The public parameters include (N = pqr, G, G T ,ê) along with:
The master secret key SK is (p, q, r, g q ,
. . , x ) with x i ∈ Z N . This algorithm chooses random s, α, β ∈ Z N and R 3,i , R 4,i ∈ G r for i = 1 to . (Note that a random element R ∈ G r can be sampled, without the factorization of N , by choosing random δ ∈ Z N and setting R = g δ r .) It outputs the ciphertext
, and random Q 6 ∈ G q . It then outputs
.
The decryption algorithm outputs 1 iff
and outputs 0 otherwise.
Correctness To see that correctness holds, let C and SK v be as above. Then
where α, β are random in Z N and f 1 , f 2 are random in Z q . If x, v = 0 mod N , then the above evaluates to 1. If x, v = 0 mod N there are two cases: if x, v = 0 mod q then with all but negligible probability (over choice of α, β, f 1 , f 2 ) the above evaluates to an element other than the identity. The other possibility is that x, v = 0 mod q, in which case the above would always evaluate to 1; however, computing gcd( x, v , N) would then give a non-trivial factor of N and so this occurs with only negligible probability (recall, our assumptions imply hardness of finding a non-trivial factor of N ).
There may appear to be some redundancy in our construction; for instance, the C 1,i and C 2,i components play identical roles. In fact we can view the encryption scheme as consisting of two parallel sub-systems linked via the C 0 component (and the K component of the secret key). A natural question is whether this redundancy can be eliminated to achieve better performance. While such a construction appears to be secure, our current proof relies in an essential way on having these two parallel sub-systems.
Proof Intuition
The most challenging aspect to providing a proof of our scheme arises from the disjunctive capabilities of our system. In the previous attribute-hiding conjunctive scheme [9] , security was proved via a sequence of hybrid games in which the "challenge ciphertext" associated with a vector x was changed component-by-component to a challenge ciphertext associated with a vector y. The adversary in that case was only allowed to request secret keys that did not match either of x or y, and so in every hybrid game it was the case that the adversary's secret keys would not "match" the challenge ciphertext. Thus, the hybrids could be handled in a relatively straightforward manner.
In our proof the adversary will again try to determine which of two vectors x or y is associated with the challenge ciphertext. However, in our case the adversary may legally request a secret key SK v that "matches" both x and y, i.e., the adversary may request a secret key SK v for which both x, v = 0 and y, v = 0. This means that we cannot use a sequence of hybrid games as outlined above. To see why, note that if we change one component at a time in the challenge ciphertext, then the hybrid vector used in an intermediate step will likely not "match" SK v (i.e., will not be orthogonal to v), and the adversary can detect this just by running the legal decryption procedure.
Therefore, we need to use a sequence of hybrid games in which an entire vector used in the challenge ciphertext is changed in one step, instead of using a sequence of hybrid games where the vector is changed component-by-component. To do this we take advantage of the fact that our encryption scheme contains two parallel "sub-systems" corresponding to the {C 1,i } and {C 2,i } components of the ciphertext, respectively. In our proof we will use hybrid games where a challenge ciphertext is encrypted with respect to one vector in the first sub-system and a different vector in the second sub-system. (Note that such a ciphertext is ill-formed, since any honestly generated ciphertext will always use the same vector in each sub-system.) Let ( a, b) denote the experiment where the challenge ciphertext is encrypted using vector a in the first sub-system and b in the second sub-system. To prove indistinguishability between the case when the challenge ciphertext is associated with x (which corresponds to ( x, x)) and the case when the challenge ciphertext is associated with y (which corresponds to ( y, y)), we use a sequence of intermediate hybrid games ( x, 0), ( x, y), ( 0, y), showing indistinguishability in each case. That is, we show
proving our desired result. (We use the 0-vector since it is orthogonal to everything.) Using this structure in our proof allows us to use a simulator that will essentially work in one sub-system without "knowing" what is happening in the other one. The simulator embeds a "subgroup decision-like" challenge into the challenge ciphertext for each experiment. The structure of the challenge will determine whether a sub-system encrypts the given vector or the zero vector. Details of our proof and further discussion are given in the following section.
Proof of Security
This section is devoted to a proof of the following theorem: Theorem 4.1. If G satisfies Assumption 3.1 then the scheme described in Sect. 4 is an attribute-hiding, predicate-only encryption scheme.
For convenience, we re-state Definition 2.2 in the particular setting of our main construction, which is a predicate-only scheme where the set of attributes is Σ = Z N and the class of predicates corresponds to inner products, namely, F = {f x | x ∈ Z N } with f x ( y) = 1 iff x, y = 0 mod N . The particular predicate we use requires a slight change in the definition, since the set of attributes depends on the master public key (but in Definition 2.2 the adversary is supposed to output I 0 , I 1 before receiving the public key). We adapt the definition in the natural way by giving A the modulus N first, then requiring it to output I 0 , I 1 before being given the rest of the public key.
Definition 4.2.
A predicate-only encryption scheme for Σ, F as above is attribute hiding if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the following experiment is negligible in the security parameter n:
is run to generate keys PK, SK. This defines a value N which is given to A. 2. A outputs x, y ∈ Z N , and is then given PK. The advantage of A is the absolute value of the difference between its success probability and 1/2.
We establish the theorem using a sequence of games, defined as follows:
The challenge ciphertext is generated as a proper encryption using x. (Recall from Definition 4.2 that we let x, y denote the two vectors output by the adversary.) That is, we choose random s, α, β ∈ Z N and random {R 3,i , R 4,i } ∈ G r and compute the ciphertext as
Game 2 : We now generate the {C 2,i } components as if encryption were done using 0. That is, we choose random s, α, β ∈ Z N and random {R 3,i , R 4,i } ∈ G r and compute the ciphertext as
Game 3 : We now generate the {C 2,i } components using vector y. That is, we choose random s, α, β ∈ Z N and random {R 3,i , R 4,i } ∈ G r and compute the ciphertext as
Game 4 : This game is defined analogously to Game 2 , though here it is the {C i,1 } components that are generated using 0. That is, we choose random s, α, β ∈ Z N and random {R 3,i , R 4,i } ∈ G r and compute the ciphertext as
Game 5 : This game is analogous to Game 1 , though now the challenge ciphertext is a proper encryption using y. I.e., we choose random s, α, β ∈ Z N and random {R 3,i , R 4,i } ∈ G r and compute the ciphertext as
The proof of the theorem is concluded once we show that the adversary cannot distinguish between Game i and Game i+1 for each i.
As discussed in Sect. 4.3, we do not know how to proceed directly from a game in which the challenge ciphertext is generated as a proper encryption using x, to a game in which the challenge ciphertext is generated as a proper encryption using y. (Indeed, this is the reason our construction uses two "sub-systems".) That is why our proof proceeds via the intermediate Game 3 where half the challenge ciphertext corresponds to an encryption using x and the other half corresponds to an encryption using y. Intermediate games Game 2 and Game 4 are used to simplify the proof; it helps when part of the ciphertext corresponds to an encryption using 0 since this is orthogonal to everything.
The main difficulty in our proofs will be to answer queries for decryption keys. In considering the indistinguishability of Game 1 and Game 2 (and, symmetrically, Game 4 and Game 5 ), we will actually be able to construct all decryption keys (i.e., even keys that would allow the adversary to distinguish an encryption relative to x from an encryption relative to y). In essence, we will be showing that even such keys cannot be used to distinguish a well-formed encryption of x (or y) from a badly formed one.
On the other hand, in considering the indistinguishability of Game 2 and Game 3 (and, symmetrically, Game 3 and Game 4 ) we will not be able to construct all decryption keys. Instead, we will deal separately with the problems of (1) Fix an adversary A taking part in the security game of Definition 4.2. We describe a simulator who is given (N = pqr, Before describing the simulation in detail, we observe that the simulator can sample a random element R ∈ G r by choosing random δ ∈ Z N and setting R = g δ r . Although there is no direct way for the simulator to sample a random element of G q (since g q is not provided to the simulator), it is possible for the simulator to choose an inde-
r . Henceforth, we simply describe the simulator as sampling uniformly from G r and G qr with the understanding that such sampling is done in this way. cludes (N, G, G T ,ê) in the public parameters, and sets the remaining values as follows:
Public Parameters
In doing so, the simulator is implicitly setting h 1,i = h p . Note that PK has the correct distribution.
Key Derivation
We now describe how the simulator prepares the secret key corresponding to the vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v ). We stress that although Definition 4.2 restricts the vectors v for which the adversary is allowed to request secret keys, we do not rely on this restriction here. This is because the purpose of this hybrid proof is to show that the adversary cannot distinguish between properly formed encryptions of x and improperly formed encryptions (which are a combination of an encryption of x and an encryption of 0).
We begin with some intuition. We must construct the K 1,i and K 2,i components of the key. We do not have access to g q , but we do have g q g a p and we will use this element here. This will give rise to terms containing a in the exponent of g p . Note, however, that we will later have to construct the K component of the key, whose purpose is to cancel out terms in the G p subgroup. If v, x = 0, then additional terms involving ab and ab 2 appear in K. But we do not have access to g ab 2 p ; indeed, if we did we could easily distinguish between Game 1 and Game 2 . We deal with this problem by adding a term to the K 1,i components (using the g ab p Q 1 term given as part of the challenge) that will allow us to cancel out the ab 2 terms that appear in K due to the K 2,i components.
The simulator begins by choosing random f 1 , f 2 , {r 1,i }, {r 2,i } ∈ Z N . In constructing the key, implicitly the simulator will be setting
as well as f 1 = f 1 − df 2 and f 2 = f 2 , where we let d = log g q Q 1 . These values are each independently and uniformly distributed in Z N , just as they would be in actual secret-key components. Next, for all i the simulator computes
The simulator next constructs the K element of the secret key. Recall that h 1,i = (g p ) bx i g w 1,i p . Therefore, the exponents in K will contain a term of the form i r 1,i 
The simulator computes K as follows: Let k = v, x . The simulator chooses random QR ∈ G qr and computes
The simulator then gives the adversary
as the key. To see formally that the K component has the correct distribution, let K p , K q , and K r denote the projections of K in G p , G q , and G r , respectively. It is easy to see that K q and K r are independently and uniformly distributed, as required. Furthermore,
using the fact that k = x, v = i x i , v i . Using simple (but tedious) algebra, we obtain
(using (1) and (2)), and thus K p (and hence K) has the correct distribution.
The Challenge Ciphertext The challenge ciphertext is generated in a straightforward way as follows. The simulator chooses {R 7,i , R 8,i } ∈ G r at random, sets C 0 equal to g s p , and computes
where {R 7,i , R 8,i } are random elements of G r whose exact values are unimportant.
Analysis By examining the projections of the components of the challenge ciphertext in the groups G p , G q , and G r , it can be verified that when ξ is random the challenge ciphertext is distributed exactly as in Game 1 , whereas if ξ = 0 the challenge ciphertext is distributed exactly as in Game 2 . It follows that if A succeeds in distinguishing these two games then our simulator can use A to break Assumption 3.1. Thus if Assumption 3.1 holds, these two games are indistinguishable. 3 where ξ is either 0 or uniform in Z q . Recall that sampling uniform elements from G r and G qr can be done efficiently. The simulator interacts with A as we now describe.
Indistinguishability of

Public Parameters The simulator begins by giving N to A, who outputs vectors x, y.
The simulator chooses random {w 1,i , w 2,i } ∈ Z N and random {R 1,i , R 2,i } ∈ G r , includes (N, G, G T ,ê) in the public parameters, and sets the rest of the master public key as follows:
In doing so, the simulator is implicitly setting h 1,i = h p . Note that PK has the appropriate distribution.
Key Derivation The adversary A may request secret keys corresponding to different vectors, and we now describe how the simulator prepares the secret key corresponding to the vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v ) . Here, the simulator will only be able to produce the appropriate secret key when the vector v satisfies the restriction imposed by Definition 4.2. We distinguish two cases, depending on whether v, x and v, y are both zero or whether they are both non-zero.
Case 1
We first consider the case where v, x = 0 = v, y . The simulator begins by choosing random f 1 , f 2 , {r 1,1 }, {r 2,1 } ∈ Z N . Then for all i it computes
Finally, the simulator chooses random QR ∈ G qr and computes
The simulator then hands the adversary SK v = (K, {K 1,i , K 2,i }) as the key. To see that this key has the correct distribution, note that by construction of the {K 1,i , K 2,i } the values f 1 , f 2 are random; furthermore, the simulator implicity sets
which are uniformly distributed as well. Looking at K p , the projection of K in G p (as in the proof in the previous section), we see that
. Algebraic manipulation as in the previous section shows that K p has the correct distribution.
Case 2 Here, we consider the case where v, x = c x = 0 and v, y = c y = 0. The simulator begins by choosing random f 1 , f 2 , {r 1,1 }, {r 2,1 } ∈ Z N . Next, for all i it com-putes
where we set d = log g q Q 1 . Finally, the simulator chooses random QR ∈ G qr and computes
The simulator then hands the key SK v = (K, {K 1,i , K 2,i }) to the adversary. To see that this key has the correct distribution, note that by construction of the {K 1,i , K 2,i } the simulator implicity sets As for element K of the secret key, it is once again easy to see that the projection of K in G qr is uniformly distributed. Looking at K p , the projection of K in G p , we see that
and so K p has the right distribution. We conclude that K has the correct distribution.
The Challenge Ciphertext The challenge ciphertext is generated in a straightforward way. The simulator chooses {R 7,i , R 8,i } ∈ G r at random, sets C 0 = g s p , and computes
where {R 7,i , R 8,i } again refer to random elements of G r whose exact values are unimportant.
Analysis By examining the projections of the components of the challenge ciphertext in the groups G p , G q , and G r , it can be verified that when ξ is random the challenge ciphertext is distributed exactly as in Game 3 , whereas if ξ = 0 the challenge ciphertext is distributed exactly as in Game 2 . It follows that if A succeeds at distinguishing these two games then our simulator can use A to break Assumption 3.1. Thus if Assumption 3.1 holds, these two games are indistinguishable.
Completing the Proof
Our scheme is symmetric with respect to the roles of h 1,i and h 2,i . Thus, the proof that 
Applications of Our Main Construction
In this section we discuss some applications of inner-product predicate encryption schemes as constructed in this paper. Our treatment here is general, and we do not rely on any specific details of our construction. Given a vector x ∈ Z N , we denote by f x : Z N → {0, 1} the function such that f x ( y) =
An inner-product encryption scheme of dimension is an attribute-hiding predicate encryption scheme for the class of predicates F .
Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption
As a warm-up, we show how anonymous identity-based encryption (IBE) can be recovered from any inner-product encryption scheme with = 2. To generate the master public and secret keys for the IBE scheme, simply run the setup algorithm of the underlying inner-product encryption scheme. To generate secret keys for the identity I ∈ Z N , set I := (1, I ) and output the secret key for the predicate f I . To encrypt a message M for the identity J ∈ Z N , set J := (−J, 1) and encrypt the message using the encryption algorithm of the underlying inner-product encryption scheme and the attribute J . Since I , J = 0 iff I = J , correctness and security follow.
Hidden-Vector Encryption
Given a set Σ, let Σ = Σ ∪ { }. Hidden-vector encryption (HVE) [9] corresponds to a predicate encryption scheme for the class of predicates Φ hve = {φ
A generalization of the ideas from the previous section can be used to realize hidden-vector encryption with Σ = Z N from any inner-product encryption scheme (Setup, Enc, GenKey, Dec) of dimension 2 :
• The setup algorithm is unchanged.
• To generate a secret key corresponding to the predicate φ 
Then output the key obtained by running GenKey SK (f A ).
• To encrypt a message M for the attribute x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) , choose random r 1 , . . . , r ∈ Z N and construct a vector X r = (X 1 , . . . , X 2 ) as follows:
(multiplication is done modulo N ). Then output the ciphertext C ← Enc PK ( X r , M).
To see that correctness holds, let (a 1 , . . . , a ), A, (x 1 , . . . , x ) , r, and X r be as above. (a 1 ,...,a ) (x 1 , . . . , x ) = 1, if, for all i, either a i = x i or x i = , 0, otherwise.
Predicate Encryption Schemes Supporting Polynomial Evaluation
We can also construct predicate encryption schemes for classes of predicates corresponding to polynomial evaluation. Let Φ Since p(w) = 0 iff p, w = 0, correctness and security follow. The above shows that we can construct predicate encryption schemes where predicates correspond to univariate polynomials whose degree d is polynomial in the security parameter. This can be generalized to the case of polynomials in t variables, and degree at most d in each variable, as long as d t is polynomial in the security parameter.
We can also construct schemes that are the "dual" of the above, in which attributes correspond to polynomials and predicates involve the evaluation of the input polynomial at some fixed point.
Disjunctions, Conjunctions, and Evaluating CNF and DNF Formulas
Given the polynomial-based constructions of the previous section, we can fairly easily build predicate encryption schemes for disjunctions of equality tests. For example, the predicate OR I 1 ,I 2 , where OR I 1 ,I 2 (x) = 1 iff either x = I 1 or x = I 2 , can be encoded as the univariate polynomial
which evaluates to 0 iff the relevant predicate evaluates to 1. Similarly, the predicate OR I 1 ,I 2 , where OR I 1 ,I 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = 1 iff either x 1 = I 1 or x 2 = I 2 , can be encoded as the bivariate polynomial
Conjunctions can be handled in a similar fashion. Consider, for example, the predicate AND I 1 ,I 2 where AND I 1 ,I 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = 1 if both x 1 = I 1 and x 2 = I 2 . Here, we determine the relevant secret key by choosing a random r ∈ Z N and letting the secret key correspond to the polynomial
Note that if AND I 1 ,I 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = 1 then p (x 1 , x 2 ) = 0, whereas if AND I 1 ,I 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = 0 then, with all but negligible probability over choice of r, we will have 2 p (x 1 , x 2 ) = 0.
The above ideas extend to more complex combinations of disjunctions and conjunctions, and for boolean variables this means we can handle arbitrary CNF or DNF formulas. (For non-boolean variables we do not know how to directly handle negation.) As pointed out in the previous section, the complexity of the resulting scheme depends polynomially on d t , where t is the number of variables and d is the maximum degree (of the resulting polynomial) in each variable.
Exact Thresholds
We conclude with an application that relies directly on inner-product encryption. Here, we consider "fuzzy IBE" [32] , which can be mapped to the predicate encryption framework as follows: fix a set A = {1, . . . , } and let the set of attributes be all subsets of A. Predicates take the form Φ = {φ S | S ⊆ A} where φ S (S ) = 1 iff |S ∩ S | ≥ t, i.e., S and S overlap in at least t positions.
We can construct a scheme where the attribute space is the same as before, but the class of predicates corresponds to overlap in exactly t positions. Namely, set Φ = {φ S | S ⊆ A} with φ S (S ) = 1 iff |S ∩ S | = t. Then, given any inner-product encryption scheme of dimension + 1, we construct a scheme as follows:
• To generate a secret key for the predicate φ S , first define a vector v ∈ Z 
Then output the key obtained by running GenKey SK (f v ).
• To encrypt a message M for the attribute S ⊆ A, define a vector x as follows:
, and x i = 0 otherwise,
Then output the ciphertext C ← Enc PK ( x, M).
Since |S ∩ S | = t exactly when v, x = 0, correctness and security follow. An interesting open direction is to create the functionality that can test if |S ∩ S | ≥ t without revealing anything more about the size of the overlap.
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Appendix A. Supporting Our Assumptions in the Generic-Group Model
We support Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 by showing that they hold in generic bilinear groups of composite order N , as long as finding a non-trivial factor of N is hard. In doing so, we first prove two "master theorems" for hardness in generic groups of composite order. These theorems generalize the result by Boneh, Boyen, and Goh [13] (with some extensions given in [15] ) in two ways: in addition to handling groups of composite order, they can be used for assumptions where the target element is in the bilinear group G (instead of the target group G T ). Thus, they also apply to assumptions such as the linear assumption of Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [10] or the subgroup decision assumption introduced by Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [12] .
A.1. The Generic-Group Model: An Overview
The generic-group model was introduced in [27, 36] , and has been extended to the case of bilinear groups in [13, 15] . This model provides a way to study "generic" group algorithms that act "independently" of the group representation (and therefore apply to any group, as long as the group operation itself can be computed in polynomial time), in a way made more precise below. It is important to qualify that various nongeneric-group algorithms are known for specific groups, and so a proof of security in the generic-group model does not guarantee security when the group is instantiated in some concrete fashion. It is, in part, for this reason that we have proved security of our constructions relative to our stated assumptions (and now justify the assumptions in the generic-group model), rather than aiming for a direct proof that our constructions are secure in the generic-group model.
In the generic-group model, algorithms are not given any "actual" representations of group elements but are instead only given access to group elements via their unique "handles". (Note that the algorithm can check equality of elements, since two elements are equal iff they have the same handle.) An algorithm in this setting can perform computations on group elements only by issuing instructions in some explicitly provided set of allowed instructions. So, for example, an element g may be represented by the handle "1" and h by the handle "2"; an algorithm can multiply these two elements by explicitly issuing the instruction mult("1", "2"). In response to this instruction, the group element gh is computed: if element gh has not already been assigned a handle, a new handle is assigned and returned to the algorithm; if gh has already been assigned a handle, that handle is returned. (So, for example, if g were the identity element then the instruction mult("1", "2") would simply return "2".) In addition to the multiplication instruction, the generic-group model also provides an exponentiation instruction exp that takes as input an element's handle and an integer, and returns the handle of the given element raised to the given power. (We allow negative exponents, so that inverses can also be computed.) For simplicity, we restrict the algorithm to only using as input those handles that it has already been given. 3 In the setting of bilinear groups, we have two groups each with their own multiplication and exponentiation instructions and whose elements all have distinct handles. We also add a pairing instruction that takes as input two handles of elements from the first group and outputs the handle of an element from the second ("target") group.
A.2. A "Master Theorem" for Hardness in Composite-Order Bilinear Groups
Before stating our theorems, we introduce some notation. We will consider cyclic bilinear groups of order N , where N = m k=1 p k is the product of m distinct primes, each larger than 2 n . Let G denote the "base group" and let G T denote the "target group"; i.e., the bilinear mapê is from G × G to G T . Each element g ∈ G can be written as g = g Similarly (a 1 , . . . , a m ) raised to the power γ ∈ Z is the element (γ a 1 , . . . , γ a m ) . (Analogous results hold for elements of G T .) It will be therefore be convenient to treat these tuples as "vectors" where vector addition corresponds to multiplication in the group and vector multiplication by a scalar corresponds to group exponentiation. The pairing of (a 1 , . . . , a m ), (b 1 , . . . , b m ) ∈ G gives the element [a 1 b 1 , . . . , a m b 
In an experiment involving the generic group, we present an algorithm A with a set of group elements generated at random according to some distribution. We describe the distribution of these group elements by a vector of monomials over a set of formal variables (written using capital letters), where each formal variable is chosen independently and uniformly at random from the appropriate domain. For example, a random element of G can be described by X = (X 1 , . . . , X m ) , where each X i is chosen uniformly from Z p i . (Random variables taking values in G T are expressed in the same way, but using the bracket notation.) Thus, when we say that an algorithm is given the random variable X = (X 1 , . . . , X m ), we mean that random x 1 , . . . , x m are chosen uniformly from the appropriate domains and the algorithm is given (the handle for) element (x 1 , . . . , x m ) . Dependencies in the random variables are made explicit by re-using the same formal variable; for example, a random "Diffie-Hellman-like" tuple (with m = 2) can be described by the three elements
We say a random group element expressed as above has degree t if the maximum (total) degree of any monomial in its vector representation is t. So, for example, in the "Diffie-Hellman-like" tuple given above X and Y have degree 1, whereas Z has degree 2.
Given two sets of random variables {X i } I i=1 and {B j } J j =1 (each expressed as above) over the same group, we say that {X i } is dependent on {B j } if there exist γ i , γ j ∈ Z * N with (γ 1 , . . . , γ I ) = (0, . . . , 0) such that i γ i X i and j γ j B j are identical as vectors of formal polynomials. If no such values exist, then {X i } is said to be independent of {B j }.
We may now state our theorems. 
Suppose each of
. Then given any algorithm A issuing at most q instructions and having advantage δ in the above experiment, A can be used to find a non-trivial factor of N (in time polynomial in n and the running time of A) with probability at least δ − O((q + I + J ) 2 t/2 n ).
Thus, if N is generated in such a way that it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of N , the advantage of any polynomial-time algorithm A is negligible in n.
Proof. We define a series of games in which an algorithm A acts as above. In the first game, which corresponds to an execution of A in the generic-group model, each of the random variables {A i }, {B j }, T 0 , T 1 is instantiated by choosing uniform values for each of the formal variables and giving the handles of {A i }, {B j }, and T b to the algorithm A. The algorithm then issues a sequence of multiplication, exponentiation, and pairing instructions, and is given in return the appropriate handles. Finally, the algorithm outputs a bit b and its advantage is measured as defined above.
We next define a second game in which the random variables are never instantiated, but instead the game only keeps track of the formal polynomials themselves. Furthermore, the game now uses identical handles for two elements only if these elements are equal as formal polynomials in each of their components. (So, in the original game the random variables X = (X 1 , . . . , X m ) and Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y m ) could be assigned the same handle if it happened to be the case that X i = Y i for all i. In this game, however, these two tuples of formal polynomials are always treated as different.) This only introduces a difference in case it happens during the course of the first experiment that two different vectors of formal polynomials take on the same value. For any fixed pair of distinct formal polynomials, the probability that they take on the same value is bounded by 2t/2 n (since the maximum degree of any polynomial constructed during the course of the experiment is 2t). Summing over all pairs of elements either given to A or produced as a result of A's instructions during the course of the experiment shows that the statistical difference between the first and second experiments is at most O((q + I + J ) 2 · t/2 n ).
In the third game, we record the formal polynomials as before except that now all computation, in each of the m components, is done modulo N rather than modulo the appropriate p i . Now, two elements are assigned identical handles only if they are equivalent as (tuples of) formal polynomials over Z N . This only introduces a difference if two polynomials are generated during the course of the experiment that are different modulo N but would be identical when each component is reduced modulo the appropriate p i . But whenever this occurs, a non-trivial factor of N can be recovered from the coefficients of any two such polynomials.
Finally, we observe that in the third game the only possible way in which the algorithm can distinguish whether it is given T 0 or T 1 is if the algorithm is able to generate a polynomial that would be formally equivalent to some previously generated polynomial for one value of b but not the other. But this implies that, for some b and γ = 0, algorithm A can construct a formal polynomial
that is equivalent to the 0-polynomial when the coefficients are taken modulo N . This cannot occur because of the assumption that each of 
Then given any algorithm A issuing at most q instructions and having advantage δ in the above experiment, A can be used to find a non-trivial factor of N (in time polynomial in n and the running time of A) with probability at least δ − O((q + I + J ) 2 t/2 n ).
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Theorem A.1 except for the analysis of the third game. As in the earlier proof, in the third game the only possible way in which the algorithm can distinguish whether it is given T 0 or T 1 is if the algorithm is able to generate a formal polynomial that would be formally equivalent to some previously generated polynomial for one value of b but not the other. But then we either have (for some b and γ = 0)
where at least one of the {α i } are non-zero modulo N (otherwise, equality would hold for both values of b). By the independence assumptions, neither of these possibilities can occur.
A.3. Applying the Master Theorem to Our Assumptions
We now show how to apply the theorems of the previous section to prove that our assumptions hold in the generic-group model. Assumption 3.2. We begin with Assumption 3.2 (since it corresponds to the simpler Theorem A.1). Using the notation of the previous section, this assumption may be written as
It is immediate that T 1 is independent of B 1 ∪ {ê(A i , A j )}. As for T 0 , the only way a dependence can occur is if the set {B 1 } ∪ {ê(A i 1 , A i 2 } can be used to produce an element of G T with first component equal to XΓ S; that monomial occurs only inê(A 6 , A 7 ), but in that element there is an additional monomial Y 1 Y 2 in the second component that cannot be canceled.
Assumption 3.1. Assumption 3.1 may be written as
It is not difficult to see that both T 0 and T 1 are independent of {A i }. Using the notation of Theorem A.2, we have S = {3, 6, 7, 9}. Considering T 0 first, we obtain the following tuples:
It is clear that C, C 3 , and C 9 are independent of everything else, since an element in G T whose third component contains Z 2 1 (resp., Z 1 Y 1 or Z 1 Y 4 ) cannot be generated in any other way from the given elements. As for C 6 , the only other way to obtain an element whose first component is AB 2 S is by computingê (A 7 , A 9 ) , which yields the element
. But there is no other way to generate an element whose second component is Y 2 Y 3 , and hence no way to cancel that term. Finally, considering C 7 , there is no other way to obtain an element whose first component is AB 3 S. Thus, each of the above elements satisfy the independence requirement of Theorem A.1. Analogous arguments apply for the case of T 1 .
Appendix B. A Full-Fledged Predicate Encryption Scheme
In Sect. 4, we showed a construction of a predicate-only scheme. Such a scheme can be used to encrypt messages, as well, but inefficiently: bit-by-bit. Here, we extend that scheme to obtain a more efficient full-fledged predicate encryption scheme in the sense of Definition 2.1. The additions in the present scheme are boxed for the reader's convenience.
Setup(1 n ). The setup algorithm first runs G (1 n ) to obtain (p, q, r, G, G T ,ê) with G = G p × G q × G r . Next, it computes g p , g q , and g r as generators of G p , G q , and G r , respectively. It then chooses R 1,i , R 2,i ∈ G r and h 1,i , h 2,i ∈ G p uniformly at random for i = 1 to , and R 0 ∈ G r uniformly at random. It also chooses random γ ∈ Z p and h ∈ G p . The public parameters include (N = pqr, G, G T ,ê) along with:
The master secret key SK is (p, q, r, g q , h −γ , {h 1,i , h 2,i } i=1 ). GenKey SK ( v) . Let v = (v 1 , . . . , v ) . This algorithm chooses random r 1,i , r 2,i ∈ Z p for i = 1 to , random R 5 ∈ G r , random f 1 , f 2 ∈ Z q , and random Q 6 ∈ G q . It then outputs .
Dec SK v (C). Let C and SK v be as above. The decryption algorithm outputs
As we have described it, decryption never returns an error (i.e., even when v, x = 0). We will show below that when v, x = 0, then the "projection" of the result on the order-q subgroup of G T is statistically close to random. By restricting the message space to some efficiently recognizable subset of G T whose size is negligible compared to q, we recover the desired semantics by returning an error if the recovered message does not lie in this subset.
to M; however, this reveals a non-trivial factor of N and so an adversary can cause this condition to occur with only negligible probability.
B.1. Proof of Security
Theorem B.1. If G satisfies Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 then the scheme described in the previous section is an attribute-hiding predicate encryption scheme.
We prove that the scheme described in the previous section satisfies Definition 2.2. In proving this, we distinguish the case when M 0 = M 1 and the case when M 0 = M 1 . We show that the adversary's probability of success conditioned on the occurrence of either case is negligibly close to 1/2.
A proof for the case M 0 = M 1 follows mutatis mutandis from the proof given in Sect. 4. Specifically, if M 0 = M 1 = M then the adversary gets no advantage from the extra term M · P s included in the challenge ciphertext and so the only point to verify is that, throughout the proofs in Sects. 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, the simulator can compute the value P s (so that it can construct the additional element C = M · P s ). This is easy to do if the simulator computes P exactly as in the Setup algorithm, and stores h −γ . We omit the straightforward details.
Given the above, we concentrate here on proving security under the assumption that M 0 = M 1 . Since we are considering only this case, we can assume the adversary is restricted to requesting keys corresponding to vectors v for which v, x = 0 and v, y = 0, where x, y are the vectors output by the adversary at the outset of the experiment. We establish the result in this case using a sequence of games, defined as follows.
Game 0 : The challenge ciphertext is generated as a proper encryption of M 0 using x.
That is, we choose random s, α, β ∈ Z N and random {R 3,i , R 4,i } ∈ G r , and compute the ciphertext as
Game 1 : We now generate the challenge ciphertext as a proper encryption of a random element of G T , but still using x. I.e., the ciphertext is formed as above except that C is chosen uniformly from G T . Game 2 : We now generate the {C 2,i } components as if encryption were done using 0.
That is, we choose random s, α, β ∈ Z N , random {R 3,i , R 4,i } ∈ G r , and random C ∈ G T , and compute the ciphertext as
This exactly parallels Game 2 in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Game 3 : We now generate the {C 2,i } components using vector y. That is, we choose random s, α, β ∈ Z N , random {R 3,i , R 4,i } ∈ G r , and random C ∈ G T , and compute the ciphertext as This exactly parallels Game 3 in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Game 4 and Game 5 : These games are defined analogously to Game 2 and Game 1 , respectively, as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. We continue to let C be a random element of G T . Note that Game 5 corresponds to a proper encryption of a random element of G T using y. Game 6 : The challenge ciphertext is generated as a proper encryption of M 1 using y.
In the next section we prove that, under Assumption 3.2, Game 0 and Game 1 are indistinguishable. Indistinguishability of the games Game i and Game i+1 , for i = 1 to 4, follows mutatis mutandis from the proofs in Sects. 4 h ) γ , and an element T which is either equal toê(g p , h) γ s or is uniformly distributed in G T (cf. Assumption 3.2). Note that the simulator is now able to sample uniformly from G q and G r using g q and g r , respectively. In particular, the simulator can sample uniformly from G qr . The simulator interacts with A as we now describe.
(where we set c = log g q Q 2 ), and 
